Political dimensions of the adoption of non-binding norms: the strategic shift of governments in geopolitical uncertainty

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20185979

Abstract

Advances in communication technologies have redefined concepts such as power and conflict, prioritizing soft power strategies over traditional hard power. This descriptive-analytical study explores why governments opt for soft law, emphasizing its role in coordinating interactions between states, mitigating damage caused by reputational sanctions, and managing uncertainty in politically volatile environments. The results indicate that the main reasons governments prefer to sign soft law agreements are: first, that soft law serves as a coordinating system for interactions between states; and second, that these norms prevent harm. In other words, international law is valuable because, in case of violation, it carries sanctions for the offending party. These sanctions are based on credibility, retaliation, and reciprocity. Third, soft law is considered an effective way for governments to consider and manage uncertainty regarding the future suitability of legal norms. This approach leads to the reform of legal norms by increasing their viability. This is a reform process that can be more effective than renegotiating international law. Customary international law (CIL) comprises the rules and decisions established by international organizations and is based on the premise that states with superficial cooperation hinder states with deeper cooperation.