

The impact of Joe Biden's rise to power on the US transatlantic foreign policy

El impacto del ascenso al poder de Joe Biden en la política exterior transatlántica de EE.UU.

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ABSTRACT

The transatlantic is associated with the historical, cultural, political, economic, and social ties between the United States and European countries on both sides of the Atlantic. Since the United States and the European Union are important and influential actors in the international system, recognizing the positions and actions of these two actors towards Regional and global developments are of particular importance. The analytical orientation of this paper is to examine the foreign policy of the Joe Biden's government in relations with actors in the transatlantic field. So the main question of the research is what effect did Biden's coming to power have on the foreign policy of the United States in the transatlantic region? In response to the above question, using the descriptive-analytical method and the theoretical framework of neoliberal institutionalism, it is hypothesized that the relations between the United States and the Atlantic region, despite fluctuations during Donald Trump's presidency, will return to normal condition during Biden's presidency. The findings of the study indicate that the United States and its European allies, despite some differences in the various terms of the presidency, have always sought to enhance cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic. As a result, despite the tangible connection or coordination that exists between the two sides in various areas in the region, they are always concerned that they will face some differences regarding the influential phenomena in the region, but both actors have tried to pursue their own interests.

Keywords: Transatlantic, American, European Union, Neoliberal institutionalism

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RESUMEN

El transatlántico está asociado con los lazos históricos, culturales, políticos, económicos y sociales entre los Estados Unidos y los países europeos a ambos lados del Atlántico. Dado que los Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea son actores importantes e influyentes en el sistema internacional, es de particular importancia reconocer las posiciones y acciones de estos dos actores hacia los desarrollos regionales y globales. La orientación analítica de este trabajo es examinar la política exterior del gobierno de Joe Biden en las relaciones con los actores del ámbito transatlántico. Entonces, la pregunta principal de la investigación es ¿qué efecto tuvo la llegada al poder de Biden en la política exterior de los Estados Unidos en la región transatlántica? En respuesta a la pregunta anterior, utilizando el método descriptivo-analítico y el marco teórico de la institucionalidad neoliberal, se plantea la hipótesis de que las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y la región del Atlántico, a pesar de las fluctuaciones durante la presidencia de Donald Trump, volverán a su condición normal durante la de Biden. Los hallazgos del estudio indican que Estados Unidos y sus aliados europeos, a pesar de algunas diferencias en los distintos mandatos de la presidencia, siempre han buscado mejorar la cooperación en ambos lados del Atlántico. Como resultado, a pesar de la conexión o coordinación tangible que existe entre los dos lados en varias áreas de la región, siempre estarán preocupados por algunas diferencias con respecto a los fenómenos influyentes en la región, aunque ambos actores tratarán de buscar sus propios intereses.

Palabras clave: transatlántico, americano, unión europea, institucionalismo neoliberal

INTRODUCTION

Transatlantic relations are considered to be one of the most enduring collaborations in international relations, with Europe and the United States as key actors in the world order based on common goals and interests in this field; therefore, understanding the currents of international relations is not possible without examining the approaches of these two actors at the economic, political, security and cultural levels. In recent decades, Atlantic relations have been affected by significant differences such as trade agreements and government tariff protections, the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the Iraq war, the UN Security Council, NATO, and so on. Because each of these actors insists on their positions in order to maintain their position on the international stage. It is always a question of where will the course of their relationship go. And does a relationship based on cooperation serve the interests of both parties? And what are the prospects for transatlantic relations in the context of the formation of a multipolar order in international relations? (Mo-

ritz, 2012: 43). For years, the question has been on the minds of international policy scholars and analysts: Do the EU and the United States pursue the same policy on international issues? According to the EU-US policy-oriented approach, democracies are the essence of liberalism. In this way of thinking, liberal peace between liberal states and the war against authoritarian regimes is implicitly a value. Therefore, in this view, political-value principles cause the coordination of the positions of the European Union and the United States (Pour Ahmadi, 2009: 43). But despite the close political and economic ties between the EU and the United States, the two major global actors disagree on some bilateral or multilateral issues at different levels of economic, political, defense and legal.

Although the United States and the European Union have the capability for independent military action, they can also complement each other. Europe can benefit from the support of the United States in its neighborhood, and the United States can ask Europe for help in the Asia-Pacific region. In this agenda, the United States and Europe have emphasized that they face new challenges at home and abroad, and to address them and responding to global challenges, expand global trade and widen economic relations, establish relations across the Atlantic, strengthen Atlantic ties, parliamentary ties, and implement and complement common issues discussed, we must engage with each other in the areas of strengthening peace and stability, democracy and development around the world. (Amiri, 2005: 128-129).

As some developing countries, such as China, become important actors in international relations, it is necessary that the two part of the Atlantic reconsider their historical relations in accordance with the requirements of their new order and position. In addition, transatlantic relations will remain strong and effective in other areas such as cyberspace, law enforcement and intelligence cooperation, while each party can maintain its independence in decision-making or ability to act independently. In general, Europeans, while taking independent steps to determine their future, can also have balanced relations with their closest partners (Belgian thinker on the website of Europe Friends, 2020).

Experience shows that security is necessary more than military capabilities to strengthen society and the economy; thus, the two transatlantic partners are well aware that their investments in security must be considered comprehensively. In this regard, given the course of relations between the two actors, the terrorist operation of September 11, 2001 caused more convergence between the United States and the European Union, and the US military invasion and occupation of Iraq also caused the divergence of Europe and the United States. This line continued to the point that with the withdrawal of Britain from the European Union and the coming to power of Donald Trump, the divergence and gap in transatlantic relations widened and the role of the United States and Britain in EU policies diminished and these two challenges and

other challenges facing the European Union in its foreign and security policy approach, gave Iran the opportunity to improve its relations with the European Union (Hatamzadeh and Noor Alivand, 2018: 162).

As Joe Biden came to power, the continuation of transatlantic relations faced two major obstacles: the “American isolationism” and the “unpredictability” of the new administration, but Biden’s fledgling government has embarked on new initiatives to cross the boundaries of distrust in transatlantic relations. Therefore, the main question of this study is to examine the effects of Biden’s tenure on US foreign policy in the transatlantic region, and the main hypothesis is that relations between the United States and the Atlantic region will return to normal during Biden’s presidency. In this paper, the effects of Joe Biden’s coming to power on transatlantic relations with the neoliberal institutionalism approach will be examined.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

Among the most influential types of liberal thought in theories of international relations is neoliberal institutionalism or neoliberalism, which is mentioned in the contemporary period. As some scholars have pointed out, this has usually been the most prominent form of liberalism in international affairs. For example, as Joseph Greco argues in his shrewd critique of such theories, neoliberal institutionalism emerged before the current wave in three successive waves: the theory of the integration of functionalism in the 1940s and 1950s, the theory of the neoliberal integration of local functionalism in the 1950s, 1960s, and the theory of interdependence of the 1970s. Perhaps we can add that the idealistic writers of the past, belonging to the period between the two world wars, also emphasized international institutions and organizations, and with that destructive realism, the nineteenth-century balance of power in the conflict was complete.

The theory of neoliberal institutionalism can be considered as a continuation of the theories of functionalism, neo-functionalism, interdependence and the paradigm of liberalism. The liberal view of international politics refers to the cooperative behavior of actors in achieving economic goals and the role of institutions as a model of cooperation. Liberals believe that governments use institutions as the ultimate solution in the global political economy.

Neoliberal institutionalism theory is based on five fundamental principles, including: systematic approach, international disorder, state rational actors, states the most important actors, and the role of international organizations. Regarding the first principle, we can say that if we understand the international system, we can understand the behavior of countries. The second principle defines international disorder as “the absence of a central government in the international system” that is able to guarantee the implementation of laws and the observance of obligations between beneficiary countries. In the third

principle, neoliberalism presupposes that states are rational beings that seek to promote and enhance the interests of their nation. Principle four considers countries to be the most important actors in the international system; finally, the fifth principle, which is the most important feature of neoliberal institutionalism theory, gives international institutions an independent identity in the international system.

Neoliberals believe that international institutions can have a significant impact on the cooperative behavior of countries in the international system. In general, international institutions help shape international agendas and act as accelerators for coalition formation, as well as fields for political initiatives and linkages. Neoliberals see institutions as a set of related formal and informal rules that; first, they recommend and prescribe certain behaviors. Secondly, it limits the scope of activities and actions of countries, and thirdly, it shapes the expectations of countries.

In addition to the five principles and presuppositions, this theory distinguishes between different structural conditions in the international system and believes that different conditions require different strategies and agendas. Each international system may have several structures that differ in their subject areas. Neoliberalism also does not consider the military force applicable at all times and in all subject areas, and in this regard believes that the effectiveness of the military compared to other capabilities depends, firstly, on the nature of the international system in which interactions take place, and, secondly, on the relevant topic (Dehghani Firozabad, 1998: 99 - 103).

Neoliberalism has also discussed the possibility of cooperation at the international level. This theory explains international cooperation by understanding the factors and constraints imposed by the international system on the cooperative behavior of governments. Neoliberalism, assuming that governments are selfish actors and seek to maximize their profits, concludes that the most important obstacle to government non-cooperation is deception and mistrust, and if this problem can be solved, international cooperation is also possible in a situation of disorder.. The theory of neoliberalism offers solutions to the problem of deception in international relations. From the point of view of this theory, this problem can be overcome in several ways and by adopting various strategies.

Institutional liberalism sees the globalization of capital, technology, production, and the formation of the global market as intensifying the process of interdependence and entanglement of actors' interests. For liberals, the adoption of common policies and participatory approaches by governments as an effective approach to problem solving, information and technology exchange, and capital increase has become inevitable. From this perspective, a collaboration model can be distinguished from other models in terms of scope (number of areas it covers), depth (degree of convergence and overlap of actors' policies), institutionalization (formal or informal institutionalization dimensions), and focus (degree of efficiency and central reference)..

One of the important points in the framework of neoliberal institutionalism theory, which pointed out by Richard Haas, is the gradual politicization of actors' goals. That is, although actors may initially pursue their technical and non-controversial goals in a participatory framework, they gradually agree to use all available tools to achieve their technical-economic goals. Based on this, and using this theoretical framework, we seek to identify and explain US foreign policy from Trump to the presidency of Joe Biden, by recognizing its components and principles of foreign policy, to examine predictable scenarios in US relations with transatlantic countries.

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS BEFORE DONALD TRUMP'S PRESIDENCY

Examining the external relations of states in the context of historical change leads us to a better understanding of the necessities of these relations processes. In addition, historical changes further reflect the conditions for the formation of relations between nations and states and the pathology of these relations. Political and economic changes after the First World War and its extension until the end of World War II led to the emergence of harmonies that lasted until the end of the decade. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the European Union as a *de facto* continental power and a potential world power, a new perspective emerged in world politics and created favorable conditions for the establishment of different relations in the worldview of states. The foundation of transatlantic relations was laid during the Cold War, but its new design was designed after the Cold War, with the draft of the Joint Transatlantic Declaration in 1990 and the presentation of the new Transatlantic Agenda in Madrid in December 1995, during which the principles of extensive cooperation and consultation the United States and Europe were established and provided a framework for cooperation between the parties on various issues (Sai and Khezri, 2009: 159-160). After the collapse of the bipolar system, a number of international relations scholars considered the United States to be the hegemon and the leading state, the most powerful state in the world, which also had the ability to direct international norms and procedures alone. Nevertheless, the other great powers continued their efforts to change this situation. Therefore, the great powers, as a potential rival, always threaten the superior position of the hegemonic state (Hasankhani and Masroor, 2017: 61).

Sensing the need for institutions such as NATO, the European Union and the United States have sought to maintain strong ties by establishing new frameworks and institutions for cooperation, and by launching the Transatlantic Declaration in November 1990, which outlined the common goals between Europe and the United States: terrorism and narcotics. Introduced the most important new security challenges and strengthened their relationship. However, in order to ensure stability in Europe, the United States has always sought

to create an economically convergent Europe, but not a politically united one. The US policymakers consider European security design as a fire trap and always try not to renew this fire trap (Joseph Nye, 2003: 14).

The US goal of creating a demilitarized Western Europe, but economically converging in the structure of US-dominated Atlantic society, was quite commensurate with another major US strategic goal after 1945. That is, preventing the emergence of new poles of power in the international system - whether in the form of a revived Germany or a united Europe - that could challenge the geopolitical supremacy of the United States. Accordingly, successive US governments, by creating a subunit, have brought Western European military forces under American command and subordinated them, seeking nationalization in the region. To this end, the United States has sought to neutralize Western Europe militarily and limit its ability to act independently of the United States in the field of foreign and security policy (AziziMehr and Hosseini Korani, 2014: 114).

Under Clinton, the foreign policy orientations of the United States were based on an international cooperation strategy based on international cooperation, which consulted and cooperated with its European partners in global politics. As a result, differences between the EU and the United States became less apparent during this period. But under Bush Jr. and the events of September 11, 2001, not only did the differences between the United States and the European Union escalate, but these events also led to a change in US foreign policy priorities. (PoorAhmadi, 2010).

The United States gradually changed its foreign policy strategy after the 9/11 attacks, which led to tensions between the EU and the United States. The US unilateralist approach after 9/11 was to move towards imperialist policy, which was pursued in US foreign policy, and in this new US strategy, US allies (Europeans) had no value. In this period, the issue that led to the height differences between the two sides was the invasion of Iraq, which not only provoked a sharp reaction from European countries such as Germany and France, but also led to a rift in European positions (Hatamzadeh, Noor Ali Vand, 2018: 165). With the coming to power of Bush and the change of some leaders of European countries, we can see the adjustment of the positions of the two sides of the United States and the European Union and greater convergence between them. But the most influential issue in improving transatlantic relations was the inauguration of Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States. By changing his approach to US foreign policy and tending to multilateralism and emphasizing the increase of transatlantic relations, Obama provided the ground for improving the attitude of Europeans towards the United States and opened more opportunities for more cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic (Izadi, 2009: 184). During this period, the volume of economic exchanges and cooperation between the United States and the European Union in various fields increased. During this period, the United

States and Europe agreed on a common strategic concept of NATO (2010), conducted joint operations in Libya, adopted a similar approach to the so-called Arab Spring developments, and united on the issues of Russia and Iran. (Matera, 2013: 64-70).

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS DURING DONALD TRUMP'S PRESIDENCY

The concept of hegemony has been defined differently. Most of these definitions refer to the differences between the definitions of power. While realists see power as having a (military) dimension, on the contrary, liberals emphasize the multiplicity of power structures. Thus, according to the first definition, hegemony is limited to military domination; therefore, if a country has a significant distance from other actors militarily, it is considered hegemony. But the definition of this research is hegemony based on multiple structures that together form the hegemony of a country in the hierarchy of world power; in other words, a hegemonic country must keep away itself significantly from other competitors in the economic, physical (population, natural resources, and geography) and military hierarchs of world power, so that it has the ability to set the rules of the game and other actors follow it. By this definition, a country may dominate other powers militarily, but is economically incapable of setting rules, in which case its hegemony is challenged. (Kolaei and Niknam, 2014: 169)

In general, as mentioned, the United States' relationship with Europe, especially after World War II, has always been strategic and important. But events like Brexit and Trump's coming to power diverted those relationships. During Trump's presidency, relations between the two sides cooled. Trump has raised concerns between the two sides by dividing Europe into new and old Europe, establishing special relations with some European governments, especially Eastern Europe, and finally supporting Britain's exit from the European Union.

Transatlantic relations in this regard should be analyzed in the context of cooperation, competition and conflict and based on their national interests. Accordingly, international-political cooperation in the form of common interests, economic relations in the form of competing interests and security-military relations in the form of conflicting interests would be studied (Pourahmadi, 2009: 45). During the four years of Trump's presidency, US foreign policy faced wide-ranging ups and downs and challenges, which created wide-ranging challenges for the world if failed in various areas.. Trump's strategy of maximum pressure began in North America and spread to China after the Middle East and Iran. The approach of the Trump administration and its foreign policy agents was based on the fact that with all-out pressures, the maximum benefits can be obtained from political compromises (IRNA, 31/10/2020).

However, in the US National Security Document 2017, the role of Europe was very important for the United States, and this union was called the most important US trading partner and the parties were interpreted as having equal interests in the face of threats such as Russia, China, immigration, etc. But Trump's "America First" approach, diminishing US leadership role in the international system, Washington's new isolationism, support for Brexit, withdrawal from international treaties such as the Paris Environmental Treaty, Trump unilateralism, his rhetoric against EU membership, pressure on EU members NATO Europeans, threatening to withdraw from NATO and ignoring Article 5 of the treaty, put serious pressure and damage on the EU's relations with the United States during this period (Mashreq News, 11/08/2013).

From the very beginning of his presidency, Trump blamed the European Union for the weakness of the US economy, believing that unions, international institutions, and international law should be in the best interests of the United States. He believed that America's allies, including the Europeans, were narrowing their distance from the United States with the principle of free riding, and the United States was paying a high price for their interests; therefore, according to the principle of "America First", Trump stated that these costs should be cut, and each ally should pay for its own security.

During Trump's presidency, he withdrew from 22 organizations and international or bilateral agreements. Among these organizations and agreements are UNESCO and the Paris International Climate Agreement, and the last organization he left was the World Health Organization, which was accused by him for miss-conducting against Covid-19. Overall, the rift in the two parts of the Trump administration under the Atlantic Ocean widened considerably for a variety of reasons, from JCPOA to redefinition of NATO and bilateral relations, to the point that Brussels leaders decided to keep away themselves from the United States even on politico-security issues.

In the economic sphere, Trump took a mercantilist, economic nationalist, and protectionist approach, emphasizing the unfairness of trade with Europe, trying to make up for the Washington-Brussels trade deficit by imposing tariffs on goods such as steel and aluminum, and effectively entering a trade war. With Trump and the European Union, Trump's policy has led EU countries to keep away themselves from the United States, move closer to China as a strategic and economic partner, and seek to strike a new balance between China and the United States (IRNA, 2/6/2017).

Thus, the differences between Trump and Europe over the past few decades have created significant tensions and gaps in transatlantic relations. While calling NATO ineffective, Trump called for an increase in European governments' share of NATO budget. It eventually withdrew in opposition to the Paris Climate Agreement, which calls a conspiracy to hit the US economy. Economic disputes and tariff wars, disputes over Russia, China, Iran and the JCPOA, relations with Eastern European countries including Poland

and Hungary, withdrawal of troops from Europe and other parts of the world, relocation of US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem Recognition of the Golan Heights as part of Israel, the deal of the century, criticism of Germany and Europe over the Stream 2 gas pipeline, and various other measures have all dealt a severe blow to Atlantic relations. So with the US position on Brexit, it was argued that Trump was seeking to weaken and eventually disintegrate the European Union. This has led to the perception in Europe that Europe should not wait for the United States to resolve its issues, and it needs to stand on its own feet. Despite the Obama administration and US politicians' opposition to Brexit, Trump welcomed Brexit and encouraged other EU governments to leave. Thus, under the influence of these principles, Trump's foreign policy led to new differences on some of the most important international issues that have been agreed on by the United States and Europe. For example, contrary to the previous approach, instead of supporting Europe in the event of a confrontation with Russia if necessary, it showed no foreign policy priorities. On the contrary, despite Europe's insistence on maintaining the nuclear agreement with Iran, it withdrew from it and did not adhere to free trade agreements and institutions, putting a lot of pressure on European allies in this regard (Wickett, 2018: 3). Finally, it should be noted that US policy toward Europe during Trump's presidency was influenced by Trump's personal variables, and Trump's unpredictable behavior led to further contemplation of Europe and a more cautious policy in bilateral relations.

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS DURING BIDEN'S PRESIDENCY

The rise of Brexit, Trump's inauguration, exacerbated several of the challenges facing the European Union. So the reaction across Europe after Biden's election victory was a combination of calm as well as uncertain expectations. The fact that Trump was so hated in most European countries was as much about his personal characteristics as it was about policies and how they were implemented. Biden was seen as an opponent of Trump, but that alone did not address questions about his expectations of a future presidency. There was a common slogan across Europe that basically said: After Trump, there will be no easy return to what we were under Barack Obama. Now, the question naturally arises as to what transatlantic relations will actually be like under Joe Biden presidency (Janse, 2021: 67).

Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, inter-Atlantic relations enter another era, but without a name and without much consensus on waiting. The post-Cold War era began with pride on both sides of the Atlantic, but can it be called the post-Cold War era today? What should we call it? The age of illusion, the age of anxiety, the return to realism? We must remember the words of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who reminded

us that there are things we know we do not know and there are things we do not know and do not know. Many could not have predicted a pandemic that would spread worldwide by 2020 and kill hundreds of thousands. Both Brexit and Trump's election shocked assumptions about the stability of the European Union and the transatlantic alliance, but 9/11 was also an unexpected wake-up call, as was the rise of ISIS in Iraq following the catastrophic outcome of the 2003 US-led invasion. Refugees around the world against violence or climate change remain unresolved challenges. All of these demands make the ability to find consensus on effective responses immediately but complexly. Under these circumstances, transatlantic relations face risks and opportunities, so Biden's choice offers both hypotheses (Saldinger, 2021: 43).

Biden begins his presidency with the assumption that he must address four key questions regarding the improvement of transatlantic relations; Where, when and how do we need each other and most importantly why? There will be differences of opinion on these questions, both in Europe and in the United States. Biden's team wants to move quickly beyond similar statements with European partners to joint action on the Covid-19, climate change, economic recovery, the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia, or, more broadly, the rivalry between tyranny and liberal democracy. Relationships have always been associated with challenges and opportunities that will be addressed in the following.

CHALLENGES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES RELATIONS

It should be noted that despite the close political and economic relations between the European Union and the United States, these two major global actors disagree on some bilateral or multilateral issues at different levels of economic, political, and defense. Given the US Constitution and the political structure of the United States and any internal changes in its power structure, the different approaches of the Republican and Democratic parties to important political, regional, and international issues have global implications.

The United States' foreign policy is not the same as it was in 2016, so its relationship with Europe and the events of the last decade have created new challenges that require new thinking about how to deal with them. Governments in the transatlantic alliance are experiencing deep bipolarity, changing political spectrums, and skepticism about the liberal order. US retreat and widespread Chinese influence, and the climate crisis, rising economic inequality, and the epidemic of the Corona virus have also contributed to this.

COVID-19 EPIDEMIC CRISIS

The Covid-19 epidemic has been affecting the international community for almost two years. Covid-19 has devastated the health and economy of nations

around the world, highlighting the problems facing the United States and the transatlantic nations in a globalized network of interdependent nations. The urgency of dealing with a borderless threat has highlighted the need for international cooperation. In addition, it has created fears that can be toxic to aspirations for cooperation abroad and across borders (Pew Research Center, 2020).

CLIMATE CRISIS

The danger of climate change is increasingly evident in many parts of the world, including the United States. By withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and creating pessimism about climate change at home, Trump thwarted a global effort to address the issue. Biden, however, said that he will return to the Paris climate agreement, and has named former Secretary of State John Kerry as his envoy. But linking climate change to complex domestic policy networks is a challenge to escape rhetoric and achieve real global impact.

CHINA'S GROWING

There has also been a changing equation of military power and influence on the world stage during this period, which necessitates a reconsideration of the challenge of maintaining a peaceful world threatened by the rivalry of great powers for power. The main arena for the United States in that competition will be the confrontation with China and Russia. However, this competition will affect other parts of the world as well. One of the changes in the field of central construction in the coming years is the current competition between the United States and China, which will have a greater impact on the global agenda. The Biden administration believes that the United States will return to leadership on the world stage. After four years in the Trump administration, it may seem appealing to Americans and some European countries, but it will no longer be welcomed elsewhere, including Beijing or Moscow, and it will not be easy.

GLOBAL CRISES

But in the long run, the United States and its partners will face global changes that are just as threatening in the face of major powers, such as; Financial crises, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the migration process, global production chains between nation states, and the impact of artificial intelligence and digital revolutions that will change the foundations of societies. How to deal with these changes and challenges is not whether everyone is threatened or not; the question is how to respond to them.

On the other hand, the foundations of the US economic system have been challenged at the state and local levels, because the forces of digitalization and technological change are destroying the infrastructure of societies and creating gaps that threaten the political and social stability of governments. Populist waves in different democracies are evidence of negative reactions to these asymmetries and are unlikely to recede in the future (Pew Research Center, 2020).

Biden outlined his strategy and thinking in an early 2020 article in *Foreign Affairs*. "As President, I will take immediate steps to re-establish democracy and alliances with the United States, to safeguard the economic future of the United States, and once again to lead the world. The Biden's foreign policy agenda puts the United States back on the table," he said. "It will put itself in a position to work with its allies and partners to mobilize collective action against global threats. The world is not organizing itself" (Biden, 2020).

Following his election in November 2020, Biden began assembling one of the most experienced national security and foreign policy teams in recent decades. They realize that the world has changed and they can not push the button back to 2016. Most importantly, they know that the main challenge they face is American reform. But the role of foreign policy in helping the United States regain its power, capabilities, and indeed its trust at home and abroad is crucial to restoring American trust and engagement in an unpredictable world. This is something Biden has to say for a tired America, especially its middle class.

The success of Biden's foreign policy program depends on prioritizing and engaging with partners while arranging what can be negotiated with competitors. The table that Biden envisions may not include a single chairman, but may be a larger roundtable of shareholders involved in a common agenda. Some argue that the combination of power and influence on the world stage may enter a stage that Charles Kupchan describes as "no one's world." The emerging international system will be filled by multiple centers of power as well as multiple versions of modernity. The interdependent world will be without a center of gravity or a universal guardian" (Kupchan, 2012: 3). Biden, however, seems unlikely to be convinced of this thesis and will argue that he intends to restore the United States' global supremacy and influence, but there is no doubt that the world system of the third decade will not be like the bipolar world in which Biden was immersed during his long political life, nor will it be more fragmented after that. Finally, what it will look like remains to be seen.

While the United States has been embroiled in internal strife in recent years, other countries have not been idle. In the Asia-Pacific region, we have seen the emergence of a new trade agreement and comprehensive economic partnership in regions that include China, but exclude the United States. In Europe, the Allies are debating the idea of placing more emphasis on strategic

independence from the United States, given their perception of greater unpredictability and uncertainty in Washington. Given the United States' economic and military power, it remains a world power, but Washington is now witnessing changes in its allies that are more sensitive to being seen as the target of US foreign policy than the subject.

As part of his bid to reclaim America's leading role on the world stage, Biden has proposed hosting a "Summit for Democracy" with partners around the world and challenges for authoritarian leaders. Dealing with authoritarian leaders and their governments is a necessity and requires a balanced approach, but the emphasis on shared commitments to democracy and the rule of law while pursuing pragmatic policies is inevitable. For example, focused negotiations with China, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iran are still needed if a coalition is formed with like-minded partners who believe Internationalism is a better strategy than government-controlled policies.

In his presidency, Biden must determine what effect his priorities and choices will have on America's allies and partners. Among these measures is a decision on how to put pressure on Iran and the Gulf Arab states to reach an agreement to replace the Iran nuclear deal. Other issues with joint ventures include cyber security, data sharing, and technological advances. In the hope that China will participate in such negotiations, it will be important to reach an arms control agreement with Russia; therefore, China will be the main topic of the Biden administration agenda in several areas

Focusing on global challenges will also address issues driven by Europe and Asia. Including India's growing role on the world stage in addressing a range of issues related to climate policy and trade networks. The instability situation in the Middle East continues to create uncertainty. Biden will inherit the Trump administration's efforts to isolate Iran and support the expansion of relations between Arab countries and Israel. He will also inherit the complex situation surrounding the ongoing conflict in Syria, which will be as complex a multi-country exercise as Russia, as well as any attempt to resume negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians (Janse, 2020: 78).

The uncertain future that exists in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which other allies, especially Germany, are claiming a share, and despite exchanged letters between Trump and the North Korean leader, there is continued development of North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities. Biden's government will face challenges in the Western Hemisphere, with many governments facing Covid-19 epidemics, ongoing violence, drug trafficking and populist dictators. Re-negotiating trade agreements with Mexico and Canada, and ultimately the need to address African leaders and their needs amid growing competition with China's efforts to consolidate its dominance on the continent, are among the challenges that will arise (Saldinger, 2020).

The problem of Iraq has been one of the most important issues in transatlantic relations. The US invasion of Iraq in early 2003, under the pretext

of dismantling the government's weapons of mass destruction, eventually led to the fall of Saddam's regime and the formation of new arrangements in Iraq and the region. This caused controversy among European governments, dividing the European Union into old and new European parts. Part of the union was opposed to the US invasion of Iraq from the beginning and had repeatedly stated its opposition to US unilateral action against Iraq.

The United States has become increasingly sensitive to the EU's growing unilateralism in its invasion of Iraq, especially without the permission of the UN Security Council and the opposition of its European partners. While the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 sparked a wave of US support in Europe, the Iraq war destroyed much of Europe's positive will for the United States, and strained relations between the United States and the European Union, and even between Created European countries together (Amiri, 2005, 134).

In general, the European Union opposed the US approach to Baghdad, citing reasons such as the growing threat of unilateralism in the international system, the possibility of a slowdown in the international fight against terrorism, and the UN's disapproval of military action against Iraq. However, the United States called the defense of its own and the world's security an excuse to invade Iraq in March 2003, calling it necessary to invade Iraq, but after the fall of Saddam's regime, the European Union sought to be better prepared to forget its differences with the United States in order to achieve its grand goals and considerations and to maintain minimal influence over Iraq's future equations. It, therefore, pursued a number of cooperative policies with the United States in Iraq, and the European Commission actively participated in the Madrid, Tokyo, and subsequent conferences to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq.

The gradual shift of world power to Asia has led to a pivotal shift in US strategy toward the Pacific. Another inescapable point is the change in the demographic structure of the United States with a decrease in the number of Europeans, and a significant increase in Asian and Spanish populations. In addition, today the EU convergence has lost its peaceful credibility after the Cold War. Nevertheless, there are still strong reasons among US officials for continuing strategic cooperation with Europe, and Biden's support to EU convergence is a pragmatic one. In his view, a stable Europe is an inevitable necessity for the United States to change its approach to Asia. A strong and credible Europe can meet many of the challenges facing the United States. Undoubtedly, the United States alone will not be able to achieve all of its goals in the international system. Henry Kissinger states in his book *Diplomacy*: "Europe will continue to play its role as a great power if it unites" (Ronald D Asmus, 2000: 290).

While the Biden administration seeks to explain to Americans that its domestic policies are designed to renew and strengthen the United States, the

question remains whether participation in all these global arenas is necessary to strengthen American power or not. To achieve this, Biden also needs allies to help him along the way. His best option is to pursue a more effective transatlantic deal with the European Union, strengthen NATO, and engage with allies in the global challenges ahead (Mashreq News, 08/11/2012).

OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES AND EUROPE RELATIONS

The United States must pursue the opportunities of transatlantic relations in the common challenges it faces as well as in the political will to meet them. The combined sources of these relations are described in a recent EU report on transatlantic relations: "Today, the combination of our global power and influence is unrivaled". We are home to nearly one billion people and two large blocs of advanced democracies. We account for about one-third of world GDP and trade and 60% of foreign direct investment. The density and openness of transatlantic trade and investment creates millions of jobs and forms large parts of the global economy, we have the ability to set rules and standards that are repeated around the world, we are the main drivers of innovation and the world's research power plants From G5 to vaccines (European Commission, 2020).

In its strategic environment, the European Union, while having different characteristics from the past, thinks of advancing the European perspective in the world politics and playing a role commensurate with its position in the international system and pursuing a policy of equality and balance of power with the United States. In other words, the EU is politically opposed to actions and initiatives that strengthen unilateralism in the international system. The union has therefore urged the United States to refrain from taking action or making major cross-border decisions without consulting other key actors in the international system in order to strengthen multilateralism. Besides, this policy may not only lead to convergence and coordination with the United States, but may even lead to differences and tensions between the two sides on various issues. In particular, the adoption of coercive policies and the unilateral use of force by the United States has contributed to the escalation of differences between the two sides. While the European Union believes in using economic and political tools to resolve disputes, the United States has shown a greater desire to use force because of its military superiority over the European Union.

AFGHANISTAN CRISIS

The war in Afghanistan was an example of cooperation between the United States and the European Union in the framework of transatlantic relations. Despite the Americans' differences and criticisms of the Europeans for their

limited military involvement in Afghanistan, we have seen a high degree of convergence between them in Afghanistan, and it can be said that one of the achievements of multilateralism has been that the United States and the European Union have taken a common approach to resolving the problems of Afghanistan.. Meanwhile, some experts believe that in order to overcome global challenges in general and Afghanistan in particular, Europe's large investment in hard power and the United States' greater commitment to soft power could be one of the foundations of multilateralism in transatlantic relations.

THE PROBLEM OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

European-American cooperation on the Iranian nuclear issue also reflects support for Washington's strategic goals. The recent movements and positions of the European Union and the statements of the officials of the three countries of Germany, France and Britain in the confrontation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in this regard can be analyzed. Although Europe welcomes the US return to JCPOA, it will take a tougher line on other issues in dispute with Iran. In general, European political behavior towards the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Biden era will not be much different from the Trump era in terms of approach. Europe, and in particular the three countries of Britain, France and Germany, are on the agenda of not pursuing a peaceful nuclear program in Iran, controlling the missile program and reducing the influence of Iran's regions. One of these basic goals is to prevent the influence of any other power from outside or inside the region in any of the major oil producing countries of the Persian Gulf, which could threaten the security of the global oil market. Despite the opposition of Paris and Berlin to the risky strategy of the US-British war of attrition in Iraq, the inevitable mutual benefits of securing the energy market eventually forced them to side with the US. Thus, the crucial point of the EU-US case in Iran is not simply to stop it from producing nuclear weapons, but to try to regulate Iran's ability to demonstrate its power in the vital Persian Gulf region.

BREXIT

However, with the withdrawal of Britain from the European Union, European cohesion and integration became fragmented. But with the election of Joe Biden as the new President of the United States and his policies, he and the Democratic Party, US-European relations will once again be on the road to the past. The United States needs European cooperation, especially its soft power, to strengthen its strategic position in the world and to counter the geopolitical challenges and threats posed by other great powers and to curb China's growing power (Center for Political and International Studies, 2020); Thus, the United States and its European allies, despite common concerns in

the region, including counterterrorism, nuclear proliferation, transnational crime, the limitation of Islamic extremism, ensuring a reliable flow of energy exports and trade, and ensuring Israeli security, there are many subscriptions to work with each other. Europe's needs to the United States, which has prevented it from playing an independent role, would probably include defense and security dependencies, strong economic ties between them with \$ 1.3 trillion in trade of goods, and services by \$ 6 trillion in investment. Between the parties, the United States' relations with Europe, and consequently Europe's relations with other countries, have always been influenced by internal changes in the United States (Center for Political and International Studies, 2020).

Biden's speech at the State Department and his emphasis on internationalism (Biden: "America is back") and coalition building and global consensus (Biden: "We will rebuild our coalitions and reconnect with the world, not to examine the challenges of the past, but also the challenges of today and tomorrow") demonstrates a contrasting approach to the United States in global relations, and in which Europe, as in the past, can play an important role.

It is important to note that the shift in US strategic policy of delegating responsibilities, especially in the fields of security and defense, did not occur only during the Trump era, but gradually in the past. That is why some European leaders, including Germany and France, have emphasized that Europe must be self-reliant and able to take control of its own destiny. Europe awaited three events with Biden's presence in the White House: first, the improvement of relations with Washington, second, the resumption of transatlantic relations, and third, the return of the United States to multilateralism in the world system. And for these above, Europe is waiting for the reduction of political tensions, tariff wars and more cooperation on various issues with the United States.

Therefore, it can be said that relations between the two sides of the Atlantic will improve with Biden's presidency. Collaborations in some areas will be more and actions and reactions will be done within the usual framework. For example, it is possible to agree on tariffs on steel and aluminum exports from Europe to the United States and to resolve the dispute over subsidies to Boeing and Airbus. But Europe has no expectations of Biden in the Stream 2 rolling project. And US-European convergence will increase in the Middle East and North Africa. Regarding the way of dealing with China, Europe expects the United States to have a less ideological view of China and change its view of that government to cooperate with partners, in which case there does not seem to be a consensus. Although there are similarities in dealing with Russia, Europe's view will be to separate economic cooperation and political relations with this government.

CONCLUSION

This article examines Joe Biden's foreign policy after his presidency and its impact on transatlantic relations. By exploring the principles behind US foreign policy, what is clear is the ups and downs in US relations with European states in recent decades. Comparing the foreign policies of Trump and Biden in this article, it can be concluded that the Trump administration systematically interpreted Europeans as aliens, but Biden has taken a cooperative approach. Thus, transatlantic trade and regulatory issues will be shaped by competing interests in both parts of the Atlantic; whether in the field of industrial and technology sectors and security issues, or privacy and data protection. In the EU, however, arguments about European sovereignty or autonomy in the transatlantic region and to find common ground with Washington are even more challenging.

In general, it can be argued that the United States and its European allies, despite cooperating on various issues, disagree on some issues, so there are still several challenges in transatlantic relations.. But US-European relations in the Biden era will once again be on the path to cooperation in the direction of strategic rationality. The United States needs European cooperation to strengthen its strategic position and past credibility in the world and to meet the geopolitical challenges and threats posed by other major powers. Europe is also looking for Biden's presidency to revitalize and play its role as a powerful bloc on important regional and international issues. Bilateral relations will be revived during the Biden period, and the US-European alliance will work in concert in various fields, but the traditional decades-old US-Europe relationship, which had become fragile, is likely to change.

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